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 Abstract  
 
For a very long time, the areas available for continuous long-distance trade were limited 
to territories the size of Braudel's Mediterranée (1949). Whatever the commercial organizations 
(merchants  in  the  Roman  or  the  Fatimid  Empires,  the  Hanseatic  League,  the  Florentine 
Companies), their trade was not able to directly handle branches more than a month's sailing from 
their main base (in the best conditions). 
During the three centuries after Vasco de Gama had reached India, European trading areas 
dramatically expanded to the shores of Asia, and a long period of harsh competition set the East 
India Companies of the main European powers of the time against one another. This paper intents 
to provide answers to two questions: what were the elements that allowed these companies to 
maintain transactions over such vast areas? And why were some of these companies far more 
successful than the others? 
To  answer  these  two  questions  we  have  available  extensive  literature  covering  the 
intersection  of  history,  business  and  economy,  generally  focusing  on  one  company  or  on  a 
particular aspect of trade (Chauduri, 1978; Israel, 1989; Subrahmanyan, 1993; Ames, 1996). Our 
task will be to briefly review these sources, to extract information from them and to compare the 
economic adaptations and innovations that allowed these companies to be the greatest of their 
time. 
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1  Introduction 
 
The  first  two  centuries  of  the  modern  age  were  a  period  of  intense  globalization 
dominated by a fulgurant increase in Euro-Asiatic trade. From this period, the dominance of two 
world companies, the Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC)) 
and the English East India Company (EEIC), is well remembered. Their organizations, often 
poorly copied by their European competitors, were highly successful. To this pair of chartered 
companies, we must add the Portuguese Estado da Índia. Although the Portuguese Estado da 
Índia was not a chartered company, it has been noted by Disney (2009) that its mercantile raison 
d'être was established and understood at its very beginning by the Portuguese rulers
2. It was a 
talented precursor of the two companies which succeed ed for the first time  in going beyond 
regional trade and establishing viable intercontinental trade. It retained the upper hand in Asian 
trade,  remaining  unchallenged  for  a  century.  Through  the  differences  between  these  three 
organizations and the elements they had in common ,  we are interested in explaining their 
successive rise and failure. 
Setting  boundaries  for  the  economic  supremacy  of  a  particular  organization  i s  an 
interesting matter, because an organization may survive  long after its heyday  has faded away. 
This is the case for our three subject s of studies. The Estado da India was set up in 1505 and 
disappeared  in  1961.  While  1505  could  effectively  mark  the  beginning  of  the  Portuguese 
supremacy  in  the  Indian  trade,  1961  obviously  has  no  economic  significance.  Due  to  the 
importance of spices in the Indian trade, we choose the year 1609, when the Portuguese lost to 
the  Dutch  the  Islands  of  Amboina,  Tidore  and  Ternate.  The  VOC  was  set  up  in  1602  and 
dissolved in 1798. The year of the above-mentioned seizure of the spice Islands determines the 
beginning of its domination. Even if the Dutch company remained an important agent in the East 
Asian trade the first decades of the eighteenth century, we have selected the year 1711 as the end 
of its economic ascendancy. This year corresponds to the establishment of an EEIC factory in 
Canton which would give the English company a definitive advantage in the fast-expanding tea 
trade. The EEIC was set up in 1600 and ended its activity in 1858. During most of the eighteenth 
century, it ruled the sea and the trade between Europe and Asia. Once the company also began to 
rule a large part of mainland India, it lost most of its independence to the British government and 
its  commercial  objectives  became  minor  ones  compared  with  the  task  of  administering  its 
possession.  So,  we  date  the  end  of  the  EEIC's  preponderance  as  being  when  the  British 
parliament took definitive control over the company's finances in 1773. 
These  periods  and  the  fate  of  each  organization  have  been  extensively  studied 
individually (Chauduri, 1978; Israel, 1989; Subrahmanyan, 1993; Ames, 1996). However, to our 
knowledge, with the exception of Furber (1976), few studies have been done on the transition 
between the successive dominant trading powers. Moreover, Furber (1976) was more interested 
in the late period and the clash between English and French ambitions in India
3. This paper is 
organized as follows: the second section recalls how difficult it was to maintain trade over a vast 
                                                 
2Disney. p. 43 "... Joao [Joao II, King of Portugal from 1481 to 1495] planned to divert as much as possible of the 
trade in spices and other valuables between Asia and Europe to an all-sea route controlled by Portugal." 
3We did not included the French India Company in our comparison, firstly because it never attained a preponderant 
position in Asian trade and, secondly, as noted by Furber (1976), the most successful leader of the French India 
Company, Joseph-François Dupleix (1697–1763), saw the company mainly as an instrument of French prestige. area  before the sixteenth  century, the third section  describes  through the differences  and the 
similarities between the Estado da India, the VOC and the EEIC the reasons for their successive 
economic dominance. Section four discusses  the importance of these reasons  and  provides a 
conclusion. 
 
2  One thousand years of regional trade 
 
Let us first specify what we mean by regional and intercontinental trade. In what follows, 
we do not consider a region as a subdivision of a nation/State but rather as a set of locations 
which have shared a common culture and authority during some period of their history. In this 
sense, from the beginning of the crisis period of the Roman Empire preceding late antiquity (234 
AD)
4 to the Mongol empire (1241) the western European region had never been in direct contact 
with India, South East Asia and China. This lack of direct contact did not mean that these regions 
did not have a vague knowledge  of each other's existence or that commercial exchange did not 
occur, but this was through intermediaries: Parthian, Persian, Byzantine, or Arab. After the peak 
of Mongol invasions, some direct contacts were established between the Khan's court and some 
western European powers
5 but it  was not until the Portuguese  had sailed around the south of 
Africa that direct regular trade relationships were established between western Europe and Asia. 
Before this period inter-regional trade existed (between Western Europe and  Byzantium, North 
Africa and the region inhabited by the Rus) and the economy of some cities had flourished upon 
it (the cities/states of Italy and Germany: Venice, Florence, Genoa, and the members of the 
Hanseatic League). However, it is remarkable, as Braudel (1949) noted, how this trade, wherever 
it developed on a regular basis, was limited to the length of time needed to cross the Roman 
Mediterranean from west to east. In this sense, the rupture of the time pattern introduced by the 
western maritime powers was a defining moment in the history of trade. 
 
3  Intercontinental trade: the successive dominance of the 
European trade powers 
 
In  what  follows,  we  are  going  to  present  elements  underlined  by  the  literature  as 
important in the development of the various European enterprizes in Asia. These elements could 
be inner characteristics of our three organizations or external factors which have played a role in 
their fate. Firstly, we introduce elements which differentiated the Estado da Índia, the VOC and 
the EEIC in their course to economic dominance: the context of their origins, their organizations 
and the financial institutions which sustained their activities. As suggested by Furber (1976), 
these conditions help to explain why the Portuguese chose a Crown monopoly and why the Dutch 
and the English chose chartered companies. The organization of trade activities in Asia positively 
distinguished the EEIC from its competitors (Chauduri 1978); quite unique financial institutions 
helped  the  VOC  to  expand  its  trade  for  a  century  (Israel  1989).  Secondly  we  explain  the 
                                                 
4Alexander the Great’s Empire and the subsequent Hellenistic realms from 323 BC to about 146 BC put central Asia 
and India in contact with the ancient Mediterranean world. Once the Roman Empire conquered Ptolemaic Egypt, a 
rich, continuous sea trade was put in place between the Roman world and India through Aden for two centuries.  
5The voyages of Niccolo, Mafeo and possibly Marco Polo are famous through the latter’s book: Le Livre des 
Merveilles du Monde. Other voyages followed in the fourteenth century: Odoric de Pordenone in 1318–1329, 
Jordanus in 1321–1330, Andrea di Nascio and Andrea di Savignone in 1336 (Jackson 2005). similarities between the three organizations: the maritime technologies they used and the fact that 
Spanish policies strongly affected their behaviors. Maritime technological breakthroughs were 
first made by the Portuguese, but the oceanic maritime powers were soon able to compete with 
them (Disney, 2009b). Spanish policies induced changes in the advance of every power trading 
with Asia (Israel, 1989; Disney, 2009a). 
 
3.1  The differences between the successive dominant European trading 
powers 
 
3.1.1  Origins 
 
The Portuguese Crown monopoly on trade with Asia resulted directly from a first phase 
of Portuguese explorations of West African coasts from 1418 to 1488
6. These explorations, often 
accompanied by the installation of commercial outposts (feitorias or factories), were financed and 
organized at their very beginning by the third son of King Joao I of Portugal, Henrique (Henry 
the Navigator) (1394–1460). He was granted a royal monopoly on the trade with all the lands 
discovered beyond Cape Bojador, by his brothers Duarte and Pedro when they were regents of 
the Portuguese kingdom. Following Henry’s death, the explorations and the trade monopolies 
were placed directly under the authority of the Portuguese Crown. Two remarks must be made 
here:  firstly  it  is  difficult  to  assess  whether  Portugal  was  a  particularly  rich  kingdom  at  the 
beginning of the fifteenth century. It was only  just emerging from a grave succession crisis. 
However, Joao I the founder of the royal House of Avis, had a systematic policy of endowing his 
children with large estates and preeminent offices. Hence a large part of the resources of the 
Portuguese kingdom were held by very close relatives of the Crown. Secondly, if not actually 
used,  commercial  companies  must  have  been  known  in  Portugal,  mainly  because  numerous 
merchants from Italy – Florentines and Genoese – were active in Lisbon
7. However, only the 
Crown seems to have been able to finance expeditions with no certainty of commercial benefit
8. 
While, as we have already noted, the commercial goals of the exploration voyages were far more 
evident at the end of the fifteenth century, Portugal was  by then already firmly committed to a 
commercial venture led by the Crown. 
When the VOC was set up in 1605, the Dutch Republic was only twenty-four years old. 
As the Republic was founded on refusal of regal authority
9, the creation of a Crown company was 
obviously not considered. As the Dutch state was mostly o ccupied in investing in its army and 
navy because of the war against its powerful former master, Spain, and as most of the discoveries 
had been already been made by the Portuguese, it could not and did not have the need to closely 
manage trade with Asia. Moreover, as the merchants dominated the political scene in the new ly 
founded republic, they were entirely ready to handle the task of establishing  regular commerce 
with the East Indies. To do so, they turned to a struct ure which had been increasingly employed 
during the sixteenth century: the company. Several companies were  set up between 1595 and 
                                                 
6Disney, pp. 30 and 38 
7On the medieval companies, see Hunt94; on the presence of Italians merchants, see Disney, p. 126 
8A certain aversion of commercial establishments to risky voyage will be demonstrated a century later by the VOC. 
The exploration expedition decided in Batavia and led by Abel Tasman (1603–1659) around Australia was not 
particularly welcomed by the directors of the company in The Hague. 
9The signature of the act of abjuration marked the independence of the seven provinces forming the Dutch Republic 
from the Spanish King Philip II. 1602 to make the journey to the spice islands
10. However, the multiplication of ventures made the 
profits  resulting from each  voyage fall  inexorably
11. In 1602,  the merchants  behind  the first 
expeditions took the decision to associate the  various companies in one, with a monopoly over 
the trade east of the Cape of Good Hope. A long process took place to finalize the  company's 
articles of association. It was long,  taking from 1602–1605, because the company's decision-
making structure had to reflect the equilibrium between the various provinces making up the 
Dutch  republic.  Finally,  in  1605,  the  Dutch  State  issued  a  charter  to  the  VOC,  granting  a 
monopoly on East Indies trade and, at the same time, guaranteeing access by every citizen of the 
Republic to the East India trade. To make this last right effective, company shares would be 
publicly traded on a stock market. 
The establishment of English East India Company predates the creation of the VOC by 
two years. Over the last decade of the sixteenth century, the strong merchant community of 
London had lobbied the Queen's government to obtain a charter that would grant a monopoly on 
the trade between England and the East Indies. The necessity to obtain regal approval would have 
important  consequences  for  the  EEIC's  first  decades.  Firstly,  the  charter  granted  by  Queen 
Elizabeth in 1600 forbade the Company to trade with territories or ports in the possession of any 
Christian prince
12. This specification was deliberately made to avoid unwelcome strife for the 
Crown with the Spanish and Portuguese governments. The contrast with the charter of the VOC, 
stipulating that Spanish and Portuguese interests in the East must be hit wherever possible, could 
not have been greater. Secondly, over the following decades, the Crown would use the  threat to 
withdraw the company's charter or to authorize another to trade with the East to extract money 
from it. Hence the sum paid by the company to Sir James Cunningham in 1618 as an indemnity 
for the money he invested in a  scheme for a Scottish Indian company, the loan granted to King 
James I for finally having changed his mind about granting a charter to the Scottish project, or the 
sum paid to George Villiers, Duke of Buckingham and advisor  to James I in 1624 as the Crown 
had not  punished the commanders of two company ships for  the attack  on  two fortresses 
possessed by a friendly European state, Portugal, in the Strait of Hormuz
13. This practice would 
be continued until the end of the reign James II
14. Thirdly, the company feared that too great an 




3.1.2  Organizations 
 
It seems obvious at a first glance that Portuguese trade with Asia, because it was managed 
directly by the Crown, should have been organized very differently from the trade of the two 
companies. In this sense, its organization was handled by Crown officers and was dual, formed 
by the Estado da Índia in charge of the administration of the Portuguese possessions – Crown-
controlled factories and entrepôts – and the Carreira da Índia, the trades routes designed as 
Crown  monopolies.  However,  as  the  sixteenth  century  went  on,  more  and  more  space  was 
allowed to private enterprise along the Carreira. Meanwhile, the VOC was particularly tough in 
                                                 
10 A total of fourteen fleets and sixty five ships were sent. Israel, p. 68 
11 Ibid, p. 68 
12 Chauduri, p. 29 
13 Furber, p. 46 
14 Chauduri p. 426 
15 Chauduri, p. 31 enforcing  its  monopoly,  as  we  are  going  to  see.  From  several  aspects  -  its  geographical 
organizations in Asia, its centralization of decisions and its enforcement of monopoly power – the 
Dutch enterprise can be looked on an improved version of the operations carried out earlier by 
the Portuguese. In these various aspects, the English East India Company was quite different. Its 
main establishments were concentrated in India and China, there was no centralized decision-
making point in Asia, and a fair amount of space was allowed to private trade. These three points, 
together with the growing taste of the European population for Indian calicos and Chinese tea, 
would have a strong influence on the shift of dominance in the Asian trade from the Dutch to the 
English enterprise. To detail these developments and differences, we will begin by detailing the 
geographical organization of the Estado da Índia and the companies east of the Cape of Good 
Hope. 
The first Portuguese contact with India was established in Calicut on the Kerala coast by 
Vasco de Gama in 1498. Two years later, a first factory was installed by Pedro Alvares Cabral in 
Cochin,  but  it  was  under  Afonso  de  Albuquerque  that  the  Portuguese  trade  networks  took 
possession of its main bases in Asia: he seized Goa in 1510, Malacca in 1511 and build a fortress 
in  Hormuz  in  1515.  During  the  following  sixty  years,  Portuguese  possessions  expanded: 
numerous cities on the west coast of  India (Kollam, Chaul, Diu, Basseim) came under their 
control, factories and fortresses were build in Ceylon, Formosa and the spice islands, and Macao 
become a large colony (see Map 1). The Portuguese network was heavily influenced by its first 
encounter with India and the fact that pepper was available in the area of this encounter. It was 
centred close to the source of pepper at Goa on the west coast of India. If this city was well 
located for the Portuguese getting their hands on the trade of the Kerala and Gujarat coasts, it was 
a long way from the islands of Ambom and Ternate and from Japan. The first two islands were 
important because they were the locations of nutmeg and clove growing; access to Japan was 
strategic because its silver bullion was used to buy Asian goods. This is why Melaka, located 
right in the middle of the route from Goa to the spice islands and to Macao and Formosa, was a 
vital stop for reaching these remote places. During the first phase of their expansion, the Crown 
tried not only to directly control every aspect of the intercontinental trade, but also the most 
lucrative lines of what was called the country trade, the trade between the different regions of 
Asia.  Crown  monopolies  were  imposed  not  only  on  pepper  but  also  on  gold,  silver,  cloves, 
nutmeg,  mace,  cinnamon,  ginger,  silk  and  pearls
16. However,  this system was complex and 
difficult to entrench, particularly where the Portuguese presence was  slight. After the 1540s, 
many monopolies were abandoned – cloves in 1539, pepper east of Colombo in 1545 – and the 
captains of Crown ships were allowed to ship private cargoes. Finally, in the 1560s, Crown ships 
were replaced by privately owned vessels on the intra-Asian Carreira, private merchants paying 
a certain sum to obtain the right to be the sole shipper on a particular route for a certain period of 
time. In fifty years, the Portuguese trade system had shifted in East Asia from a global monopoly 
handled directly by the Crown to a private-Crown partnership. 
When  the  Dutch  penetrated  in  the  Asian  seas,  they  cautiously  avoided  the  main 
Portuguese strongholds and headed directly for the sources of spices, where they know their grip 
was weak. To do so, they experimented with a direct route through the Indian Ocean from South 
Africa to South Asian islands, passing south of India. In 1605, they captured Amboina, Tidore 
and Ternate. They built a stronghold at Banda Neira in 1609, at Jakarta – renamed Batavia in 
1619  –  and  at  Pulicat  on  the  east  cost  of  India  1613.  In  less  than  fifteen  years,  the  Dutch 
enterprise  had  laid  its  hands  on  the  main  supplier  of  clove,  nutmeg  and  mace  and  on  the 
                                                 
16Disney, p. 150 alternative  source  of  pepper  offered  by  the  island  of  Sumatra.  They  had  also  eliminated 
Portuguese and English competition from the South East Asian islands and had installed their 
first country trade route between the south-east coast of India and the spice islands in order to 
exchange Indian cotton for spices. From this moment onwards, the company's first objective 
would be to strengthen its monopolies on spices and to weaken its competitors. Between 1640 
and 1668, they wiped out the Portuguese power in Ceylon and sized the monopoly on cinnamon; 
they captured Portuguese fortresses in south-west India and hence became master of the two main 
sources of pepper; they broke the resistance of Malacca and put strong pressure on the smuggling 
activities  based  in  the  area  around  it.  At  the  end  of  mid-1660,  the  VOC  entirely  controlled 
country trade between the various Asian regions and intercontinental trade between Asia and 
Europe (see Map 2). The monopoly power of the company was organized through two hubs: 
Batavia in Asia and Amsterdam in Europe, the efficiency of the former depending on a extensive 
bureaucracy, and the occasional use of brute force, and on a general entrepot and an innovative, 
thriving  merchant  community  in  the  latter.  Unlike  the  Portuguese,  the  Dutch  company  was 
continually seeking to enforce its monopoly power. The production, transfer and the distribution 
of Asian trade was entirely under the company's control: spice trees were uprooted in order to 
control the quantity produced, company ships were used to transport goods and the company 
directed the distribution of Asian goods during an annual sale in Amsterdam. 
While the EEIC entered in the Indian Ocean at the same period as the VOC, its expansion 
was far less aggressive. There were some victorious fights against the Portuguese but the English 
company's business was always limited in its operation in the spice islands by the expansion of 
the Dutch. Mostly, the EEIC was present where the competition between European nations was 
maintained by a strong local ruler and where the VOC was rebuffed. At the beginning of the 
eighteenth century, the English presence was the most strongly perceived in Bombay, Madras, 
Calcutta and Canton (see Map 3). These places were not particularly well located for the spice 
trade,  but  they  were  at  the  core  of  the  region  of  calico  and  tea  production.  In  Europe,  the 
consumption of these goods was rapidly increasing, particularly in comparison with a relative 
stagnation of spice consumption. In addition, unlike its competitor the EEIC was not participating 
to the Asian country trade. This is not to say that the company captains or the ships rented by the 
company were not participating this trade – on the contrary there was strong incentive for a 
captain to do so – but it was not under the banner of the EEIC. The reason for this exception may 
be  that  smuggling  activities  were  possible  for  English  captains  without  the  company  being 
involved. This had an important effect on the VOC's business: the more English captains there 
were available, the more breaches of its various monopolies there were. 
 
3.1.3  Financial Institutions 
 
Whatever the organization, financing the silver bullion needed to trade with Asia was 
often a problem. It was partially solved for the Estado da Índia and the VOC by involvement in 
the country trade with Japan and access to its silver bullion when Spanish silver was insufficient 
or  inaccessible.  However,  to  advance  this  bullion,  financial  institutions  were  required.  The 
Portuguese were relying on New Christian, Genoese or Florentines private bankers. The origins 
of  these  private  banking  activities  went  back  to  the  end  of  the  Middle  Ages  and  were  not 
specifically  related  to  the  development  of  the  East  Indian  trade.  In  Amsterdam,  financial 
institutions like the Amsterdam Exchange Bank, started in 1609, or the Amsterdam Loan Bank, 
started in 1614, were set up to facilitate trade for Republic's merchants. These two institutions, 
supported  by  the  city  of  Amsterdam,  helped  to  create  a  climate  of  confidence  in  the  trade established in the United Provinces
17. Interest rates were particularly low and consequently the 
VOC merchants were able to buy the goods they needed on Asian market well in advance of their 
competitors, a fact that aroused repeated complaints from the factors of the EEIC
18. It was only 
with the accession to the  English  throne of  William III that the institutions developed in 
Amsterdam were introduced in England.  They were taken to a new dimension, as  the bank 
created  was to be  the Bank of England. After the  merger  of the new and old East Indian 
Companies, the Bank would develop very close ties with the EEIC and allow it to borrow money 
at a very favourable rate. At the time when trade supremacy was shifting from the VOC to the 
EEIC, the EEIC was able to borrow as much money as the VOC at similar rates. 
 
3.2  Points in common 
 
3.2.1  Maritime technologies 
 
The  development  of  maritime  technologies  was  essential  to  the  foundation  of  direct 
commercial relations between the East and Europe. During the fifteenth century, the shipbuilding 
industry made important progress on the Iberian Peninsula. This progress resulted in the design of 
the caravel – a lightly crewed vessel, solid in the strong Atlantic winds. It was with this kind of 
ship that the Portuguese explored the coast of West Africa and circumnavigated the Cape of 
Good Hope to India. Once the trade route from the West to India was established, two new types 
of vessel were designed: the carrack, a far more spacious ship than the  caravel, designed to 
transport large cargoes but more difficult to manoeuvre and, in the first decade of the sixteenth 
century, the galleon, which was a successful attempt to combine some qualities of the caravel and 
the carrack. Throughout the sixteenth century, the other Atlantic countries were rapidly catching 
up with the advances made by the Portuguese and the Spanish, particularly the English and the 
Dutch, with the development of faster, lighter galleons. 
Knowledge about  maritime routes  and coastal  civilizations  was also  slowly spreading 
during the sixteenth century. Cartographers were drawing maps with clear details of the coast of 
Africa for the princes of the European and Ottoman courts at the beginning of the sixteenth 
century
19,  and  travel  literature  written  by  Portuguese  traders/explorers  was  translated
20.  In 
addition – and this is a fact not sufficiently stressed in the literature - the knowledge of ocean 
sailing accumulated by the seafaring communities must have played a particularly important role. 
With the very low literacy rate of this period, this knowledge could not be easily disseminated, 
and most of it must have been transmitted by contact established between mariners. Seafaring, or 
it would be more appropriate to say oceangoing, communities in Portugal were used to fish or to 
organize  passage  for  troops  off  the  Portuguese  and  North  African  coast  during  the  fifteenth 
century
21. Mariners for the first explorations and the  subsequent trade adventure to India came 
                                                 
17Israel, p. 78 
18Furber, p. 188 
19The Portuguese Fernao Vaz Dourado (1520–1580), the Fleming Gerardus Mercator (1512–1594) and Abraham 
Ortelius (1527–1598), or the Ottoman Piri Reis(1465–1554). 
20 For example, the Livro de Duarte Barbosa (1516) by Duarte Barbosa (?–1521) translated into Italian in 1556, the 
Coloquios dos simples e drogas da Índia (1563) by Garcia de Orta (1501–1568) translated into Spanish and Latin in 
1578. Or, more importantly, the book written by Jan Huygen van Linschoten in Dutch Reysgeschrift van de 
Navigation der Portugaloysers in Orienten on the Portuguese maritime trade route, published in 1595 
21 Disney, p. 142: "Portugal also developed a capacity to move substantial military forces by sea using sailing ships. from these coastal communities
22. Moreover, as the sixteenth century was entering in its second 
half and the demand for more qualified mariners to crew the Carreira da Índia was increasing, a 
constant shortage of manpower developed
23. Mariners from  North Atlantic European countries 
were employed on the Portuguese vessels. A transfer of the tacit knowledge about the routes, the 
dangers  and  also the opportunities  lying  beyond the Cape of Good Hope  is likely to  have 
happened between mariners of various origins. 
Taking into account the importance of tacit oceanic knowledge could also  throw a new 
light on  the divergence of views between the supporters of Braudel  (1979) and Israel (1989) 
about the rise of the Dutch power. For Braudel  (1979), control by the Dutch of bulk trade in 
Europe was preparing the dominance  of the Dutch economy over Europe trade throughout the 
seventeenth century. It was  a consequence of the long-term movement from a Mediterranean -
centered world to a North European-centered one. Israel (1989) rightly noted that the dominance 
of the Dutch merchant marine over bulk shipping was established long before the surge of Dutch 
power, and moreover it was never an absolute control of this trade. Rather than the bulk shipping 
industry in itself, it is surely more the case that the knowledge gathered by the  sailors from the 
maritime provinces of the  Low Countries, and the extent of this industry , which provided an 
essential precondition to the  subsequent  success of the United Provinces. The share of the 
population of the Low Countries concerned in maritime activities was surely greater than that in 
any other European country at time: the vessel used to transport bulky goods (salt, timber, grain) 
and the herring busses used to fish in North Atlantic waters were heavily manned. In addition, the 
mariners on these ships were used to staying at sea for long periods. There were other important 
seafaring communities in Atlantic Europe (obviously in Portugal, England or France) but no 
population had enjoyed such a concentration of maritim e knowledge and no population was so 
singled-minded about maritime activities. 
A final point illustrates the importance of human capital. A interesting question is why the 
great  empires  that  the  Europeans  have  been  in  contact  with  did  not  try  to  emulate  th eir 
technologies. First of all, none of these Empires (Ottoman, Mughal, Chinese) – perhaps with the 
exception of one (the Japanese Shogunate) – were oceanic powers. As has been underlined by 
Subrahmanyan (1993), the Asian trade was a trade of three seas: the Arabian Sea, the Gulf of 
Bengal and the China Sea. Even at the edge of two great oceans, there was no community used to 
ocean seafaring, and, moreover, there was no need to develop the technologies making it possible 
to stay away from the coastline in rough waters for a long time. The most important knowledge 
was to know how to handle the wind in the monsoon season. It is also worth remembering that 
the European market had very little to offer to Asian traders. If there was a lack of incentive from 
the point of view of Asian traders, the military incentive was far from tenuous. The Ottoman 
Empire could provide two examples: firstly there were some strong attempts to impede European 
trade and, secondly, that these attempts were not successful without oceanic knowledge. At the 
time the Portuguese made their first contact with India, the Ottoman Empire was at its height. 
Traders of the Sublime Porte were worried about the entry of an aggressive new player in their 
trade with the west coast of India. To counter the Portuguese, a naval expedition was decided on 
in 1507. The outcome was the Battle of Diu. In this battle, the Ottoman galleys were largely 
                                                                                                                                                              
This capacity made serious campaigning in North Africa possible – and without it the famous Ceuta expedition of 
1415 could not have been mounted." 
22 Even the greatest admiral, Vasco de Gama (1460–1524) came from the small port city of Sines on the south-
eastern Coast of Portugal. 
23 Ibid, p. 144 overcome by the Portuguese caravela redonda. One hundred years later, privateers hoisting the 
gold crescent banner attacked English and Spanish vessels in the Atlantic, they raided Reykjavik 
and were seen from the shores of Virginia. These ships, although operating under the colors of 
the Ottoman Empire, were commanded and manned by European renegades. The most famous 
were Simon de Dancer operating from Algiers, Jan Janszoon operating from the Moroccan Port 
of Salé and his vice-admiral Mathys Van Bostel Oosterlinch. All of three were born on the shores 
of the northern or southern Netherlands and had acquired great experience of ocean navigation 
before sailing from north Africa . 
 
3.2.2  Spanish policies 
 
During  the  sixteenth  century,  Spain  was  the  sole  superpower.  Through  its  financial 
largesse and the extent of its possessions it had a say in most of the affairs of the world. Spain 
would played a crucial role in the decay of the Portuguese trading system, in the ascent and the 
dawn of the Dutch Imperium and in the rise of English power in the East. 
With  the  exception  of  the  Philippine  Islands  from  1571,  the  Spanish  kings  had  little 
interest in Asia and were globally respectful of the term of the treaty of Tordesillas (1494) and 
Zaragoza (1526), which divided the world  between the two realms  of the  Iberian peninsula. 
However, in 1580, after two reigns which failed to provide an heir to the Portuguese throne, 
Philip  II  of  Spain  claimed  and  succeeded  in  obtaining  the  Portuguese  succession.  The  two 
kingdoms were not merged but associated, each keeping its specific features but with a sole king 
in  charge  of  the  affairs  of  the  two  countries.  This  association  would  last  until  1640,  when 
Portugal regained its independence. Although Philip II stayed two years in Lisbon after being 
crowned king of Portugal and envisaged installing his court in the city, he soon  returned to 
Madrid. From this moment, Philip and his successors seem to have envisaged the association of 
the two countries in the continuation of their previous policies, policies which were centered on 
Spanish  interests.  This  fact  would  have  several  consequences.  Under  Portuguese  kings,  the 
Estado da India ranked among their two main concerns, the other being the Brazilian colonies. 
For the King of Spain and Portugal, it  came behind the administration of his possessions in 
Europe and on the American continents. Portugal would also be engaged in wars it would have 
surely not have fought as an independent country. These wars would have dramatic consequences 
on the Portuguese trade in Asia. Finally, Portuguese human and physical capital was dispersed 
between  Portugal  and  Spain  and  its  possessions:  numerous  merchants  from  Lisbon  were 
extending but also re-establishing their activities in Seville and Antwerp, many of the most able 
servants of the Portuguese administration, who could have served in the Estado da India or in the 
Brazilian colonies, were serving Philip II in Madrid; admirals, ships and sailors which could have 
protected the Carreira were fighting wars in Europe. 
The best way to embody these points is through the conflicts pitting Spain against its rebel 
provinces in the Low Countries, the future Dutch Republic. Warfare in the Low Countries had 
began during the reign of Philip II. His son Philip III decided to revert to the policy introduced by 
his father of all Spanish and Portuguese possessions blockading traders from the rebel provinces. 
As the maritime provinces of the Republic were mainly living off providing a general entrepôt 
and trade platform between southern and northern Europe, the blockade was aimed at depriving 
the  provinces  of  their  main  sources  of  revenue.  Trade  between  the  Iberian  peninsula,  the 
Mediterranean and the Low Countries effectively decreased, as is shown by the number of ships 
from the Low Countries calling in the Iberian ports during the years of blockade (see Table 1).  
 Table 1: Direct voyages from the Iberian Peninsula to the Baltic, 1620–1641 
   
   
 Year    Total for all 
nations  
 Dutch    Year    Total for all 
nations  
 Dutch  
1620    105    91    1630    28    3  
1621    61    36    1631    64    10  
1622    56    2    1632    30    6  
1623    99    3    1634    55    25  
1624    86    2    1636    43    18  
1625    40    0    1637    39    10  
1626    36    0    1638    66    27  
1627    22    1    1639    64    41  
1628    9    0    1640    30    14  
1629    14    0    1641    56    34  
 Source: Bang, Tabeller, pp. 218–340 
 
   
 It was now far more difficult for Portuguese spices unloaded in Lisbon to reach the North 
European  markets
24  but  this  was far from the worst  effect on  Portuguese interests in India. 
Cornered by the Spanish blockade and forced to give up a large part of the non -rich maritime 
trade it normally handled, the young republic could only engage itself more  heavily in the rich 
trade. As we have seen in 1602, the VOC was founded with the help of the Dutch State with the 
clear objective  of attacking Spain and Portugal's  power, prestige and revenues in Asia.  There 
followed the systematic attacks on Portuguese possessions in Asia until the twelve-year truce we 
have described. During the truce period, Portuguese trade through the Carreira da India surged 
again.  But,  once  the  truce  ended,  the  VOC  became  even  more  dedicated  to  destroying  the 
Portuguese power in Asia, and extended its operation far beyond 1640, when Portugal was freed 
from Spanish influence. 
 The impact of Spanish policies on the English trade with Asia was less dramatic but still 
notable. For similar reasons  to the Dutch company, the EEIC was founded in 1600. Its first 
developments were made also at the expense of some Portuguese positions but to a far lesser 
extent than the VOC. Moreover, a peace agreement was reached in 1623 between the EEIC and 
the  Estado  da  Índia  which  was  globally  respected.  An  interesting  point  is  that  the  trading 
communities in London were certainly less bold in developing their activities east of the Cape of 
Good Hope during this period. As England was at peace with Spain when Spain was still at war 
with the United Provinces, the trade between northern Europe and the Mediterranean area was 
almost free of Dutch ships. London merchants which were generally as interested in the Asian 
trade  as  in  the  Mediterranean,  gained  a  great  deal  from  these  markets  due  to  the  Spanish 
blockade. England gained more in Asia from the outcome of the war between Spain and Portugal 
for the latter's independence. After 1640, Portugal was desperate to reach alliances with powerful 
European kingdoms to counter the Spanish pressure on its frontier. In 1654, England reached a 
                                                 
24 It can be added that the almost unending period of war against the protestant republic during the Habsburg 
domination of Portugal was not only bad for the East India trade but also for Portugal generally. One of the main 
exports from the Portugal homeland was salt from the region of Setubal. This was used by the Dutch herring fleet to 
salt its fish. This trade was completely stopped. treaty  with  Portugal  which  give  the  English  merchants  the  right  to  trade  freely  and 
advantageously in all Portuguese ports and possessions
25. In addition, a few years later in 1662, 
England received Bombay as a  dowry for the  marriage of Princess Catarina of Portugal with 
Charles II
26. The island, next to Surat, was leased by the crown to the EEIC. These elements 
strengthened the position of the EEIC in India and East Asia  in the middle of the  sixteenth 
century
27. In 1702, the War of the Spanish Succession began, setting France and Spain against the 
maritime powers – England and the Netherlands – and Austria
28. Charles II, last descendant of 
the  Spanish branch of the  Habsburgs, died without a heir   and  two candidates claimed  the 
succession – Philippe d'Anjou backed by France and chosen on his deathbed by Charles II and 
Leopold I, favored by the maritime powers. Although England and the United Provinces were on 
the same side during this war, the conflict contributed to the shift of power from the Dutch to the 
English. As pointed out by Israel (1989): "The Dutch, forced to concentrate their spending on 
their army, were deeply uneasy at seeing Britain become more and more dominant in the naval 
war."
29  The Dutch  busy  strengthening their southern frontier , never filled the gap agai n, the 
dominance of the British navy and army being demonstrated in India four decades later when a 
Dutch naval expedition sent to Hugli was easily defeated. 
 
4  Discussion 
 
To conclude this paper, let us first recapitulate the elements which played a role in the rise 
and failure of each successive European enterprise in Asia. The rise of Portuguese power in the 
East was primarily due to an unprecedent series of explorations of the West African Atlantic 
coast and numerous innovations in the maritime sector aimed at facilitating these explorations. 
They were organized and managed by a Portuguese Crown motivated by a mixture of economic, 
political and religious incentives. It is difficult to imagine that a private, commercially motivated 
enterprise would ever have achieved the same long-term operation, largely because of the very 
low  immediate  financial  return  easily  extractable  from  these  voyages.  But,  although  the 
Portuguese  Crown  was  an  efficient  tool  in  establishing  the  first  direct  intercontinental  trade 
between Western Europe and Asia, it seems to have been far less efficient in directly running a 
trade monopoly. During the second half of the sixteenth century, Portuguese authority may have 
found a system of public-private partnerships which, imperfect as it was, allowed the Crown to 
manage the Asian trade with relatively limited assets. However, it was unable to withstand a 
well-financed, remarkably manned and single-minded privately owned enterprise. 
The stellar success of the VOC was surely due to the fact that, at the time it was set up, 
two factors came together for triumph. On the narrow strip of Dutch territory human capital 
particularly competent in the three most valuable domains for the Asian trade – shipbuilding, 
seafaring and international trading – was gathered, and these skills could only be mobilized in the 
vast domain of Asian trade because of the Spanish embargo. 
Unlike the transition between the Portuguese trade and the Dutch Emporium, the shift 
from a VOC-dominated Asia to an EEIC-dominated one was a long one, and the VOC was still a 
                                                 
25Disney, vol. 1 p. 227 
26Ibid, vol. 1 p. 229 
27In the case of East Asia, by facilitating contact with the Portuguese community in Macao 
28As the ruling power of the southern Low Countries 
29Israel, p. 372 wealthy company during the first decades of the eighteenth century. Three factors came into play 
in  favor of the EEIC: the stabilization of the structure of the company, its  locations  and its 
management. Its stronghold were situated in the tea and calico production centers which were 
increasingly appreciated in Europe. The management of the EEIC offered its captains strong 
incentives to develop their own trade. And the trade of the English captains and ships in the 
Indian and East Asian seas was slowly but constantly eroding the Dutch country trade. 
If we have explain the success of each trading power at the expense of the others, the 
questions of why the Portuguese did not resist the Dutch more efficiently or why the VOC did not 
react more quickly to the development of the EEIC remain partially open. Part of the answer to 
these two questions could depend on the same argument: the interests of the authorities in the 
State where the commercial enterprise originates and of the commercial enterprise itself had 
slightly  diverged.  As  we  have  seen,  during  Spanish  rule  Portuguese  interests  were  not  put 
forward. Moreover,  slightly before the integration of the Portuguese  Crown and  after  it was 
restored , the Brazilian colonies were at the top of the agenda for the Portuguese kings. In the 
case of the VOC, the problem between the company and the State of Holland was well identified 
at the turn of the eighteenth century. As England was a stable country, huge investment was 
needed to maintain the Dutch military maritime power. However, the constant danger on the 
frontier of the seven provinces gave the States General no choice other than investing heavily in 
an army stationed in the Low Countries. This argument is also valuable for the EEIC, its period 
of dominance corresponding to the time where the English State unequivocally supported the 
company, financially and military. Its decline during the second half of the eighteenth century 
occurred in a changing world, where the military agenda and the capture of territory in India 
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Figure 1: the Portuguese Trade Network in 1580 




Figure 2: the Dutch Trade Network in 1670 




Figure 3: the English Trade Network in 1740 
    
 
 